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An Interview With LTC Bob Crowley, U.S. SOUTHCOM 
IN MINE ACIION 
Nicole Kreger (N K ): \X'har has rhc military comr ibutc:d ro m ine 
action over the past 15 years? 
LTC Crowley (LTC C): I can on ly calk about wh at we've done in 
Larin America, in the SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] 
AOR [area of responsibiliry], for rhc pasr I 5 years. Even before 15 
years ago, before rhere was a U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action [H MA] 
Program , which ar the rime was called Demin ing Program, we had 
Special Forces folks down in Honduras training the Hondurans how 
ro demine. Fi rst of all, the way the program works is the Department 
of Scare has rhc lead. They have the final determination on whether 
we' re going co have an H MA program with another country or not. So 
until that dete rminacion is made, we can' t do any demining training. 
Bur when ir is made, what wear SOUTH COM bring ro rhe cable is 
techn ical expertise, and we've had acrive demining programs in 
Guatemala and El Salvador char are closed down now; current pro-
grams are in Nicaragua, Honduras, Ecuador, Peru and the new one in 
Chile. 
So what have we done? We 
helped the Organization of 
American Scates [OAS] establish 
MARMINCA [Mission of 
Assistance for rhe Removal of 
Mines in Central America], which 
is an OAS program that relies on 
office rs and non-commissioned 
officers from throughout Larin 
America in the MARM INCA 
Center, which is in Managua. 
We've rrained deminers in all rhc 
countries I just mentioned, and in 
addition, we've built regional mine 
action centers [MACs] in Ecuador 
and Per u . 
What we do from rhe 
Department of Defense [DoD] side is a Train-the-T rainer program 
w irh three components to ic. We'll have a ream of experts that's assem-
bled in rhe United Scares char is comprised of military Special Forces 
personnel and sometimes conventional engineers as well. We always 
have Civil Affairs personnel and informacion operations specialises char 
go down. The ream will go to the Humanita rian Demining Training 
Center [HDTC] our at Fort Leonard Wood where they will be trained 
co the inrernarional standard as deminers. They need ro have char cer-
tification before they're allowed to go anywhere, and once rhey ger 
down there, there are rhree components ro rhe program. T he first 
componenr is rhc technical advice and assistance in training: how ro 
identifY a minefield, how to mark a minefield , how to clear it, how to 
remove the mines, working with dogs-the soup co nurs of demining. 
Bur manual or even mechanical d emining alone is nor a stand-alone 
operation. The two other compo nents are mine risk education-for 
example, I mentioned rhe Superman comic books [landminc aware-
ness tools published by DC Comics in cooperation with rhe U.S. 
Department of Defense and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)]. 
Thar's d1e second aspecr-rhc third aspect is in o rgan izing and run-
ning regional mine action centers, which includes rhe database train-
ing char we reach as well as rhe community outreach and development 
char our civil affairs personnel work on rhc demining missions. And 
we're very close co closing out programs in Nicaragua and Honduras. 
Ecuador and Peru will rake a little while longer. Chile has 273 mine-
fields on rheir northern border area, and chat will rake a few years. Bur 
in Southern Command, we are postured ro be rhe firs r regional com-
batant command char is mine-safe. That's a huge success. 
NK: H ow would you ~ay the role of rhc milir.1ry in h umanita rian 
dem ining ha~ changed or develo ped over rhc years? 
LTC C: Initially, the program, l wouldn't call it ad hoc, bur it rook 
Department of Defense and Southern Command awhile to establish 
the relationsh ips that we have with OAS, ro come up wirh rhe exacr 
right template of forces that arc needed for a problem. Righ t now, 
before any demin ing mission, we do a comprehensive pre-deployment 
sire survey ro ident ifY exactly whar the ream needs to do when they're 
down rhere, and char's done about six months before the m ission. 
During that period of ti me, the ream is gai ning the siruarional aware-
ness of rhe mine problem on the ground, what the community needs, 
rhe rypc of training rhe partner nation military needs, and is able to go 
th rough a very programmatic process and p reparation phase, so that 
when they go down, it's not a bunch of guys showing up saying, " Hey, 
we know how ro dcmine. What do you need?" lr's a thought-out, well-
organized, planned and executed procedure wirh a number of check-
by Nicole Kreger, MAIC 
l 
I 
lisrs ro make sure chat we're nor leaving anything out anti we're 
addressi ng all of che requirements char nor just the pa rtner nation mil-
itary bur also rhe communiry needs. Fifteen years ago, it was nor as 
well-programmed, and char's just a martcr of growrh and continuity of 
personnel in key positions and experience in rhe program. 
N K: You wn c jusr calking about adtlrc:~'ing the communil) ncc:d~­
how tloc~ rhe commu nity rcacr or how receptive are rhc: y ro the m ili-
tary co m ing in and conducting the demining opera tions? 
LTC C: First of all, all of the countries in which we're currently con-
ducting demining operations-Nicaragua, Honduras, Ecuador, 
Peru-these are countries chat are used ro having a military presence 
because our demining operations and HMA programs started after 
their conflicts were over. They have gone from a period of either civil 
war or imernational conflict where people are killing each other ro a 
period where now the military is coming in and helping them get their 
land back. The communities are wonderfully receptive. lr is absolute-
ly unbelievable. We're received wirh open arms by community leaders 
and rhe population. We're rhere to help them solve their problem. The 
community relations is a critical componenr of it, and char's whar our 
civil affairs personnel work when they're down rhere. I can't chink of 
an instance where we've had anything but wonderful reception from 
rhe community-from the national level all the way on down ro the 
people chat are in a particular community of any size. 
NK: How would you say rhe m ilir.uy approach ro mine acrion i~ dif-
fc renr rro m the hu manitarian sector approach? 
LTC C: Thar's a great question. Probably rhe biggest difference is 
that we do nor acrually conduce demining operations. We rrain the 
trainers on how ro conduct demining operations. And char's a policy 
d ecision char the United States has made in which our forces are nor 
authorized to actually pick up or remove mines. Our m ission is to 
trai n rhc partner nation personnel in how ro do char. Now, if you look 
at HALO Trust or MAG [the Mines Advisory Group]-a number of 
rhc NGOs !non-governmental organizations] go out and rhey actual-
ly conduct the demining operations themselves. Our focus really is on 
capacity building in the demining area and not the conduct of the 
dcmining operations. 
NK: \XIhc n yo u' re saying char you train rhe trainer\, are you 
usually tra in ing the in-counrry milir.t ry? 
LTC C: Yes, we are. And in rhe case of MARMINCA, for example, 
MARM INCA again is an OAS organization, but thar's an internation-
al group of military personnel . Our focus for the procedures, the actu-
al dcmining operations, yes, we are training the ocher militaries on 
how ro demine in rheir own country. 
NK: What would you say are chc bcndlts or drawbacks o f using m il-
ita ry forces a~ opposed ro an NCO or a corporate organit<ltion carry -
ing our dcm ining? 
LTC C: First of all, l th ink it's right chat the military has rhe lead 
responsibili ty for demining wirhin rheir own country. The mines are 
rhere as a result of what had been a military problem, and I chink it's 
mosr appropriate that the military take care of char problem. I respect 
the Dickens out of NGOs char do ir. Ir's a wonderful humanitarian 
piece. Bur I would rarher see somebody in uniform risking h is life to 
do it because it's a military problem, rather chan seeing an NCO lose 
rheir life or limb. And hopefully our train ing is such rhar we won't 
have accidents where the dcminers wind up gerring hurt. 
NK: Can you give me an example of a success story that you know of 
of the milit.try in humanitarian demining? 
LTC C: The biggest success story we're going to have in the 
SOUTHCOM area is coming up. Ecuador and Peru were fighting a 
border war in 1994. Following their ceasefire agreement, the United 
Narions established rhe United Narions Mission ro Ecuador and Peru 
(UNME
P) . 
Now, there are still tensions in thar area between Ecuador 
and Peru. It's been a disputed border; the ccasefire agreemenr reestab-
lished the border. Bur, later on chis year-and we' re looking at rhe 
fourth quarter-we're going to be conducting a humanitarian mine 
action mission char is nor bilateral in nature. Mosr of them arc-we go 
ro country "X" and work wirh chose people. In chis case, we're going 
to have deminers from Ecuador and Peru rrain at the Peruvian 
Engineer School. We will train them in dcmining tactics, techniques 
and procedures. Then we will go up ro the border area, the 
Peru/Ecuador border, and those deminers will conduce demining 
operations on borh sides of the border. Whar does that mean? That 
means Peruvians are going co be demining Ecuador and Ecuadorians 
are going to be demining Peru. And chen from there, we'll go to 
Quito, Ecuador, where we'll conduct some follow-on training. Thar is 
a multilateral as opposed ro a bilareral mission. Absolutely a huge suc-
cess, and we're looking towards fourrh quarter of this year to execute 
chat mission. 
NK: Do you th ink it i~ important for mine actio n programs to have; 
visiting mil itary T echnical Advisors? 
LTC C: Ir depends on the capabilities of what they have .... Nor 
always. You cake a look ar Honduras and Nicaragua, right now chose 
programs are almost complete. There are Nicaraguan deminers right 
now in Iraq char were trained by the United Stares military. Now chose 
guys are as good as anybody. Do they need us now to cell rhem how 
to demine? No. They don't need our assistance at this point. So ir 
depends on rhe maturity of the program chat they have in their partic-
ular coun try. I expect when we gee down to Chile and starr the pro-
gram in Chi le in 2005, they've got a very professional army, so our 
technical assistance will hopefully be relatively limited and we won'r 
have to srarr ar the ground floor with rhe Chileans. So ir depends on 
rhe capabilities and rhe particular situation in any given country. 
NK: How d o you feel rhe tra in-rhe-rrainers program has helped our 
mil itary and host n.uions? 
LTC C: One of rhe ancillary benefits we ger from any operation we 
do of chis nature is the individual contacts and bonding, for lack of a 
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rary professionals o r whether they're doctors rhar are doing an 
exchange or academics, ir doesn't marrer. There's a cultur al under-
standing and growth that occurs through rhis program and our o ther 
human itarian programs that, in rhe long term, is a huge, huge benefit. 
So rhe individual contacts and mutual understanding that develop are 
as valuable as anyth ing else. 
NK: \X'har role d o you th ink rhc rnilir.uy can pl.t y in \t.mda rJ , for 
d cmin ing rcc.. hno logy? 
LTC C: l rhink rhe roles that we have right now wirh the HDTC 
doing the training rhcy do, plus the OSD SO/LI C [Office of the 
Secrctaty of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity 
Conflict] research and development folks do absolutely tremendous 
work. I wouldn't say it needs to be adjusted. They wi ll go to a coun-
try, look ar a particular situation in terms of terrain, weather, where 
rhe communities are located-any number of facrors-and they'll 
look at ir and say, "You know what might help here is a piece of equip-
ment or some sort of technology rhar could do this." Well whatever ir 
is they chink would work best doesn't exist, so rhey will go manufac-
ture that, and rhc:y'll rake it down to this country and they'll rest it. 
And the Office of the Secretary of Defense fully funds rhar program. 
We've gor equipment down in Ho nduras right now that rhey're doing 
a final rest on. The benefits to rhe partner nation are absolutely 
tremendous, and from a techno logy standpoint, it's those guys who 
work om of OSD SO/LIC a t Fort Belvoir, Vi rginia, that bring a huge 
amount to the table, whether it's experimenting with unmanned aeri-
al vehicles, wirh ground penetrating radar ro idenrif)t m ines-rhose are 
tremendous technological advances that we can capitalize on . 
NK: Wh.n du you rhink is rhe role fil r the mili t.try in m ine ri>k 
.:duc...ll ion .rnd victim assisranc.: ? 
LTC C: That's rwo separate questions, so I'd like ro answer each sep-
arately. In mine risk education, our role is ro work wirh rhe commu-
nities and through the community leaders ro help them develop a 
good solid mine risk education program. You know, kids are kids, and 
so often, as you know, children are the victims of land mines; people 
working in rhe agricultural community are rhe victims of land mines. 
Our role is to help the communities in which they live develop srrong 
programs char are coherem, rhar receive rhe necessary funding, thar are 
well enough pur rogether so that they're sustained, thereby reducing 
the number of landmine victims while rhe demincrs go ahead and ger 
an area cleared of mines. 
The other question ... that is a great question , and I was 
talking to the guys from rhe Polus Ccnrer, because in rhe HMA 
Program we really don't have a role in victim assistance. Bur we have 
other programs within Southern Command rhat can assist wirh that. 
We have a humanitarian assistance program. W e have humanitarian 
and civic assistance programs. I would see an example of an organ iza-
tion like rhe Polus Center working in Leon, Nicaragua, where we've 
also worked, primarily after Hurricane Mitch, when Southern 
Command provided both immed iate and long-term disaster rel ief and 
reconsrrucrion ro Central America. In Leon, they have a victim assis-
tance center that need s renovation o r they're trying to build a new o ne. 
We have DoD-funded programs rhar can help with that type of thing, 
and that's rhe type of partnership that I think really goes a long way ro 
rhe mutual benefit of everybody concerned-the United Stares, rhe 
partner nation, the NGOs we partner with, rhe United States m il itary, 
the partner nation military, and rhe ultimate beneficiary being rhe 
mem bers of rhe community that live there. That's where I think we 
can make rhe most money and get the most yardage our of rh is pro-
gram. 
NK : Do you think the mili tilfy i' hertl'J 'u itc: d for m ine acrion rhan 
the h uman itarian s.:cror? 
LTC C: I wouldn't say that at all. I wou ld say there are professionals 
in the humanitarian sector, and 1 would say there are professionals 
in the military. We arc nor at all interested in competing. We're imer-
csrcd in working together to solve mumal problems rhar affecr the 
world community. 
N K: T hat was something you 'pok.: about earlier- partnerships 
and how im porr.rnr they .rre. I "'1.' wondering how you th ink 
rhe mil itary can compkm.:nr ot her o rg, mit.t tiom worki ng in humani-
t.lria n dcmining. 
LTC C : W hen I was just mentioning the humanitarian assista nce 
program, I rhink rhar's a great example. We've partnered wirh anum-
ber of NGOs throughout the region al ready, both international 
NGOs, the larger ones, as well as local, community-based civic acrion 
groups. Our partnersh ip opportuni ties arc more lim ited by imagina-
tion than they are by fu nd ing. Now, we certainly have some real-world 
concerns; we can't, from a military standpoint, say, "OK, let 's go do 
rhis type of project in this a rea" just because somebod y's asked us ro, 
bur there are many, many cases where there is a confluence of interest, 
and those need ro be pursued vigorously ro make sure rhar we gener-
ate a sort of synergy through the confluence of interest and maximize 
all of our capabilities ro achieve whatever particular objective ir may be 
ar rhe time-whether it's education, whether it's health, whether it's, 
as you mentioned, victim assisrance, rhar's another area rhar parmer-
sh ips are certainly viable. 
• Photo c/o MAl C. 
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The Role of 
Military Technical Advisors 
Introduction 
In 1989 a multinational contingent of soldiers began to 
arrive in Pakistan tO support a humanitarian mine action program for 
Afghan refugees. They were, in effect, Technical Advisors (TAs) in rhe 
field of humani ta rian mine action, and in rhe years since, military TAs 
have participated in many other programs. This has nor been withom 
irs controversial aspects. 
For rhe purposes of chis discussion (and acknowledging char 
some will not fir rh is description precisely) a military TA is a serving 
soldier who is attached ro a humanitarian mine action program in a 
training, advisory and memoring capacity. The military TA differs 
from visiting military forces in three respects. He or she is nor-or 
should nor be- a short-term visiror, bur rather is in theTA position 
for a period of six months ro one year. The military TA is nor parr of 
a fo rmed military unit, although national contingents within a pro-
gram are usually under rhe command of their senior representative for 
administrative, personnel and disciplinary purposes. Finally, he or she 
is nor armed and may nor necessarily wear a uniform. 
l must confess a certain bias on my part. I have been a mi l-
itary TA and I am immodest enough ro believe rhat my efforrs were 
nor entirely in vain. I have also known and worked with many mili-
tary TAs, from my own country and from others, and while they were 
nor all well-suited ro rhe task, I believe rhar most of them did good 
work. Somewhat inevitably, therefore, I am going to conclude rhar the 
use of military T As is not a bad thing. I have structured rhis discussion 
according to what I perceive ro be the three main concerns: ability, 
money and philosophy. Or, more simply, can they do the job, how 
m uch do they cost and should they be doing it an}'\vay? 
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